Introduction
The phenomenon known as the call of conscience occupies a
place of centrality in Heidegger’s Being
and Time. In his commentary of the text, Stephen Mulhall recognizes this
central position and gives a heightened analysis of the phenomenon. Eventually,
Mulhall is led to the conclusion that the call of conscience, as presented in Being and Time, is conceptually incoherent.
This leads him to launch into a lengthy rescue effort of the concept. In order
to fully understand Mulhall’s claim I will thoroughly unpack his interpretation
of the phenomenon. In the end, I hope to demonstrate that a different
interpretation of the phenomenon prevents the supposed incoherency from
arising. I will demonstrate this through my own exegetical analysis of the text
guided infrequent references to other scholars.
Mulhall
on the Call of Conscience
The centrality of the
call of conscience is strongly highlighted from the fore of Mulhall’s analysis.
Mulhall claims that the ontological possibility of death, as a
potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, is given its ontic foundations within the
phenomenal experience of the call of conscience. Specifically, Mulhall tells
his readers that,
it is one thing to demonstrate that it is
logically possible for Dasein to individualize itself in an impassioned freedom
towards death, and quite another to show that, and how, this possibility can be
brought to concrete fruition in the everyday life of a being whose
individuality is always already lost in the ‘they’. Accordingly, Heidegger next
[in the analysis of the Call of Conscience] attempts to locate the onti roots
of this ontological possibility—to identify any existentielll testimony of the
genuine realiability of Dasein’s theoretically posited authenticity. (138)
Without an account of a
concrete phenomenological experience, Heidegger’s reliance on “death,” as
Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, will remain foundationless. Without
this foundation the entire project of capturing Dasein in its wholeness so that
it can become the fore-having of an interpretation will be undermined. Therefore,
conscience becomes the ontic possibilities upon which much of Heidegger’s
project is situated.
Due to the centrality of the call of conscience in
Heidegger’s project, Mulhall’s concern over the conceptual coherency of the
phenomenon is not without warrant. If the call of conscience fails in any
manner, the remainder of Heidegger’s project in Division Two will fail with it. In the course of his analysis,
Mulhall stumbles into a potential incoherency to the phenomenon which he sees
the need to remedy through many sections of his commentary. What gives rise to
that incoherency? A closer look at Mulhall’s interpretation of the call will
provide a possible answer to that question.
The character of the call of conscience is, according to
Mulhall, “a mode of discourse—a form of communication.” This understanding
provides us with a fitting starting point for Mulhall’s interpretation. Since
the call of conscience is a mode of discourse we must answer four questions
concerning it: (1) who does the calling—the addresser; (2) who is called—the
addressee; (3) what is called about—the content; and (4) what is the addressee
called to do. I will take up these questions in a somewhat backwards order,
beginning with the last two. Mulhall’s answers on each of these will be
telling.
To begin, Mulhall is clear that the content of the
call—what is called about—is nothing. The voice of the call remains silent. To
fully understand why the caller imparts no positive content in the call, it is
important to immediately answer the fourth question: what is the addressee
called to do? As Mulhall sees it, the intended function of that communication
is a disruption of “the idle talk of the they-self to which Dasein is
ordinarily attuned, to elicit a responsiveness in Dasein that opposes every
aspect of that inauthentic discourse” (138). In other words, Dasein is called
to itself. Because of this function, Mulhall maintains that the call must
oppose the essential aspects of the ‘they-self’, i.e. ambiguity, idle chatter,
and curiosity (138). Since the call is in fundamental opposition to ‘they’ it
cannot reflect any features of public discourse.
This requirement of the call brings us back to the third
question with an understanding of why the caller remains silent. The voice must
remain silent in the call otherwise it could not perform its intended function
from delivering Dasein away from the ‘they-self.’ In fact, any such positive
dictation of content would put the voice in essentially the same position as
the ‘they-self’—a proscriptive source of conduct in which Dasein’s responsibility
for decision is disburdened. As Mulhall says, “any such dictation [of
proscriptive content in the call] could only further repress Dasein’s capacity to take over its own life. In short, ‘conscience
discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent’” (139 emphasis
mine). In other words, Dasein, in being called to its ownmost potentiality for
Being-a-whole, must be called via a dictation which is silent. Otherwise the
burden of authentic decision would not be placed squarely upon Dasein itself.
From the foregoing analysis it is already clear that the
addressee of the call is Dasein itself. But who is giving the call? Mulhall’s
answer to this question is telling and, consequently, it is important to cite
him at length on the subject:
Who, then, addresses Dasein in this way? Whose
is the voice of conscience? We cannot specify the caller’s concrete features,
for it has no identity other than as the one who calls; the summoner exists
only as that which summons Dasein to itself. But this voice is one that Dasein
hears within itself, and is usually understood as an aspect of Dasein itself;
so can we not conclude that, in the voice of conscience, Dasein calls to
itself? For Heidegger, matters are more complex. He agrees that the voice of
conscience is not the voice of someone other
than the Dasein to whom the call is addressed, not the voice of a third
party. But neither are
Dasein-as-addressee and Dasein-as-addresser one and the same. For the
Dasein to whom appeal is made is lost in the ‘they’, whereas the Dasein who
makes the appeal is not (and could not be, if its silent voice is to disrupt
the discourse of the they-self). (139, emphasis mine).
In other words, Dasein calls to
itself, although the Dasein called to and the Dasein calling are not one and
the same.
Furthermore, the “passive aspect” of the call—i.e. the
silence of it—points to something more about the addresser. In particular it
reveals the addresser’s thrown condition (140). As such, the call “recalls”
Dasein from the ‘they-self’ and into a confrontation with its own genuine
possibilities. In the end, “the voice of conscience is that of Dasein in so far
as it ‘finds itself in the very depths of its uncanniness’” (140). According to
Mulhall this is why the call is marked by no content. It is Dasein in its bare
throwness calling from its uncanniness to Dasein enthralled by the ‘they-self.’
So, on Mulhall’s reading, the addressee is Dasein as lost
in the ‘they-self.’ The addresser is Dasein in its authenticity, although this
Dasein is not identical to the addressee. That which is called about is
nothing—as this provides the opportunity for Dasein to decide authentically for
itself. And that which the addressee is called to is an awareness of its
ownmost authentic possibilities. This interpretation of the fourfold structure
of the call as a form of discourse is what lays the groundwork for Mulhall’s
incoherency. More specifically, the non-identity of the addressee and the
addresser are solely responsible for this incoherency. As Mulhall claims “[t]he
central difficulty is that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as inherently split or
doubled” (144).
What then, is this central difficulty created by the
“split” Dasein? Mulhall sums up the difficulty as follows:
But, for Heidegger, the voice utters a call that
Dasein makes from itself to itself; it is the voice of Dasein’s repressed but not extinguished capacity
for genuine selfhood. And, yet, if that capacity is genuinely repressed, how
can it possibly speak out? If it can, its repression must already have been
lifted; but it is just that lifting, that transitions from inauthenticity to
authenticity, which the call of conscience was supposedly invoked to explain.
(144 emphasis mine)
In light of Mulhall’s analysis,
this question is truly poignant. The transition which the call of conscience is
being invoked to explain must be presupposed in order for the call to be heard.
Upon this analysis there is no way around this difficulty. Mulhall’s solution to
this difficulty is radical and seems
go beyond what Being and Time will
tolerate.
Specifically, Mulhall claims that we must posit a third Other,
which is already authentic, which can call Dasein to its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being: “The intervention of such a person would constitute an
existential disruption of the hermetic, self-reinforcing dispersal of Dasein in
the they-self, a way of recalling the self to its own possibilities without
requiring an incoherent process of internal bootstrapping” (145). Locating the
addresser external to Dasein deflates the apparent incoherency of Heidegger’s
account.
Mulhall maintains that this analysis does not truly go
beyond the text nor beyond the phenomenological evidence. As far as the text is
concerned, Mulhall is resolute on the fact that “when Heidegger briefly refers
to the voice of conscience in his discussion of language, he talks of ‘hearing
the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it’ (BT, 34:206)” (145).
As to the phenomenal content of the call, Mulhall claims that it would come
“from outside or beyond us” and that the addresser, if already authentic,
“could not consistently wish to impose upon us a specific blueprint for
living”—i.e. the silence of the call. Additionally, since the authentic other
would be urging us towards authentic selfhood, the addresser would function as
an external representative of an aspect of ourselves” his or her voice would be
a “proxy for the call of our ownmost potentiality for authenticity” (145). In
conclusion, Mulhall maintains that the call of an authentic third party “would
be perceived by us as possessing just the phenomenal characteristics Heidegger
uses to define the voice of conscience” (145).
This proposal is not without objections. Perhaps the most
significant objections are the following: how did the third party voice become
authentic? and why does Heidegger explicity speak against the possibility of a
third party? To the first question Mulhall gives a very interesting answer.
After analyzing Dasein’s essential historicality, and locating historical
others which serve as voices of authenticity (e.g. Heidegger is our voice of
historical authenticity, and for Heidegger, Yorck is among the voices of
historical authenticity), Mulhall takes up the question of who the first
authentic individual was. Who was the ‘self-befriending friend’ who brought
himself out of inauthenticity. Mulhall’s response is that such a “first or
self-befriending friend would be required only in a world in which human
inauthenticity was universal and absolute; and Hedeigger’s conception of human
existence neither entails nor permits such a possibility.” In other words, on
some level an awareness of our authenticity is always present. Even in complete
repression of that awareness, there are vestiges of it in the voices of Others
and it is through this voices that we are brought back to ourselves.
To the second question Mulhall has very bold answer. He
gives a type of psychoanalytic critique of Heidegger himself. Central to his
analysis is the claim that Heidegger could not bring himself to admit that
another had really delivered him into authenticity. Heidegger is maintaining
that “the transformation from inauthenticy to authenticity can be brought about
through the relevant individual’s own
resources” because that model “allows him [Heidegger] to present himself as
having done so entirely out of his own resources, as having single-handedly
created his fundamental ontology and his deconstruction of the philosophical
tradition he inherited” (148). In the end Mulhall’s diagnosis is damning: “What
this shows, I believe, is the frightening depth of Heidegger’s need to think of
himself as self-originating” (148).
But is Mulhall’s project truly necessary? Heidegger was
emphatic that the identity of the call was not that of a third party. Yet, it
seems that Mulhall’s critique is pointed: if we do not posit the awakening call
of a third authentic party, then the incoherency of bifurcated Dasein calling
to itself results. Or does it? It is clear that the central point of pressure,
which gives rise to this incoherency, lies in the bifurcated self, half of
which is repressed the other half of
which is enthralled in the they. To see whether or not Heidegger truly viewed
Dasein as dualistic, in the manner Mulhall makes manifest, will require a close
reading of the relevant portions of the text, with the aid of other
commentators.
The
Bifurcated Call of Conscience?: A Closer Examination of the Text
Before undertaking this phase of the analysis, it is
important to be reminded of the four elements involved in the call as a mode of
discourse: (1) who does the calling—the addresser; (2) who is called—the
addressee; (3) what is called about—the content; and (4) what is the addressee
called to do. Since it has become clear that the supposed incoherency arises
with the positing of a barrier between the addresser and the addressee, the
lion’s share of the analysis will focus on this portion. On the occasions that
the last two elements will further aid in the explicating of the relationship
between the first two, that information will be interjected.
To begin, Heidegger gives a rather brief analysis
concerning the identity of the addressee. He simply claims that “In the call of
conscience, what is it that is talked about—in other words, to what is the
appeal made? Manifestly Dasein itself. This answer is as incontestable as it is
indefinite” (BT 272). Furthermore, he claims that the
characteristics belong to the addressee are Dasein “in this understanding of
itself which it always has, and which is concernful in an everyday, average
manner.” In other words, “The call reaches the they-self of concernful Being
with Others” (BT 273). As to what the ‘they-self’ is called unto, Heidegger is
clear that it is called to its “own Self”
(BT 273). In addition, during the act of hearing and responding to the call,
since it is the self of the they-self
that gets appealed to “the “they”
collapses” (ibid). The content of the call is empty, “The call asserts nothing,
gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell” (BT 273). This
vacant aspect of the call demands that Dasein respond to its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being. The call does not replace the ‘they’ but calls Dasein
to itself. This call can be painful as it brings Dasein out of the grips of the
‘they’ into lonely isolation. As Michael Gelven puts it, “This is surely a
sensitive insight into the occasions of conscience, for there is often a
feeling of loneliness and terrible isolation when we are forced to concern
ourselves with “matters of conscience”” (Gelven 163)
Interestingly, the phenomenal content present in the
call, leaves the identity of the caller aloof; at least from the ‘worldly’
orientation. Heidegger says it best: “If the caller is asked about its name,
status, origin, or repute, it not only refuses to answer, but does not even
leave the slightest possibility of one’s making it into something with which
one can be familiar when one’s understanding of Dasein has a ‘worldly’
orientation” (BT 274). Heidegger also
points out that the addresser is completely absorbed in the task of calling us
to something. As such it does not allow to be interrogated as to its identity.
However, Heidegger is emphatic that the addresser, “by no means disguises
itself in the call” (BT 274). Its identity is not available to the ‘they-self’
but it can be disclosed via hermeneutical analysis.
So, what additional phenomenal characteristics are at our
disposal in determining the identity of the caller? The call comes apparently
free of our volition, “‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even against
our will.” However, the suddenness of the calling does not necessarily point to
an outside source: “The call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is
with me in the world. The call comes from
me and yet from beyond me and over me”
(BT 275). Aside from this, the phenomenal information seems to have been
exhausted. At this point Heidegger posits a thesis as to the identity of the
addresser to determine whether or not it aligns with the existential analytic
of Dasein previously given. Specifically Heidegger asks a question: “What if this Dasein which finds itself [sich befindet] in the very depths of its uncanniness, should be the caller of the
call of conscience?” Heidegger answers this question positively, “Nothing
speaks against this; but all those phenomena which we have hitherto set forth
in characterizing the caller and its calling speak for it” (BT 276).
Heidegger then begins to show how each of the
aforementioned phenomena cohere with this proposal. Since the call comes to
Dasein dispersed in the ‘they’ the call is “like an alien voice.” Furthermore, the identity of the caller, from the
worldly perspective of the ‘they’ is not identifiable. Hence, the call seems to
come from beyond the ‘they-self,’ although in an unfamiliar way from the self
as well. Since the thesis posits the addresser as being Dasein in its
uncanniness, the keeping silent of
the call is significant. The content of the call is so unfamiliar to Dasein
mired in the ‘they’ that it could not understand a call from uncanniness in
terms of the categories given to it by the ‘they.’ Instead, the call remains
silent and simply lights up Dasein’s awareness of its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger’s final analysis is that the call of
conscience (the entire phenomenon) exhibits itself as the call of care:
the caller is Dasein, which, in its throwness
(in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. The one
to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself . . .). Dasein is falling into the
“they” (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is
summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience—that is,
conscience itself—has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in
its very basis of its Being, is care.
It seems clear enough that the
two interlocutors (i.e. addressor and addressee) are at their ontological root
one and the same.
Clearly Heidegger seems to be maintaining that these two
different aspects of Dasein have completely different characteristics yet are
identical. So, the question becomes, how do we maintain an identity between
these interlocutors when it is so clear that there is a type of bifurcation
between the two? This tension seems to resist resolution and it is for this
very reason that Mulhall posits a bifurcation between the two interlocutors. To
be sure, he recognizes that they are really one and the same. Yet, their modes
of operations and characteristics are so distinct that, at least according to
Mulhall, there is a true bifurcation between these two aspects of ourselves:
the ‘they’ self and the repressed
authentic self. In this manner, Mulhall seems to cross breed a Heideggerian
understanding of the self (Dasein) with a Freudian understanding of the
self—i.e. a self which has repressed, subconscious content.
Up to this point, my analysis of Heidegger’s text has
closely paralleled Mulhall’s. We have both interpreted the content of the call
and the identity of the callers in the same way. But in order to avoid the
incoherency which Mulhall sees I wish to posit a distinction which is not foreign to Heidegger’s analysis.
This distinction will, I believe, allow a resolution of the apparent conflict
between the identities and differences of the interlocutors. Specifically, I
will posit the distinction between the perspective
of the ‘they-self’ and that of the ‘authentic-self.’
I will begin with an analysis of the call of conscience
from the perspective of the authentic-self. Heidegger is completely explicit
that the two interlocutors are one and the same. He claims that a continued
analysis of the “who” of the interlocutors is necessary in order to establish
their identity at the ontological level. Specifically, Heidegger claims that:
we shall not obtain an ontologically adequate
Interpretation of the conscience until it can be made plain not only who is called by the call but also who does the calling, how the one to whom
the appeal is made is related to the one who calls, and how this ‘relationship’
must be taken ontologically as a way in which these are interconnected in their
Being. (BT 274)
Further on, Heidegger asks the
question, “is it all necessary to keep raising explicitly the question of who does the calling? Is this not
answered for Dasein just as unequivocally as this question of to whom the call
makes its appeal? In conscience Dasein
calls itself” (BT 275). For Heidegger, the continued focus on the ‘who’ of the call is necessary in order to
establish the identity of the two interlocutors at the deeper,
existential-ontological level. Heidegger continues by saying, “This
understanding of the caller is more or less awake in the factical hearing of
the call. Ontologically, however, it is not enough to answer that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the
one to whom the appeal is made” (BT 275). What is required is analysis which
demonstrates that hypothesis by linking the interlocutors up via care.
So, from the perspective of a deeper, hermeneutical
analysis, the identity at the fundamental, ontological level between the two
interlocutors will become apparent. While Heidegger doesn’t explicitly claim
that this awareness is only made available via the categories available to the
authentic-self, such a proposal isn’t out of harmony with Heidegger’s wider
project. The identity of the apparently
distinct interlocutors comes into its clearest relief when the interpreting is
done from an authentic perspective. For, it is only from this perspective that
an accurate existential-ontological understanding of Dasein can be achieved;
and it is specifically at this level, at the level of care, that the identity
becomes explicitly clear.
From the understanding and the categories of the
‘they-self’ the self-same identity of the caller with the called is in dispute.
As already shown, Heidegger claimed that the identity of the addresser is
unfamiliar when Dasein “has a worldly orientation” (BT 274). Consequently, the
addresser’s identity is unknown when Dasein is mired in the categories of the ‘they.’
By extension, the call seems to come from beyond Dasein in its worldly
orientation, although in a strange way it originates out of the self. Since the
identity of the addresser is not known to the ‘they-self’ the call does not
appear to come from the self. Although, there is a basic, unreflective
awareness that the call does not come from an outside source either. The
ambiguity of information does not cease here. The content of its call is empty
for any positive dictation would be interpreted in the categories of the ‘they’.
Instead, the call simply brings Dasein to an awareness of itself thereby
ripping it from the grips of the ‘they’.
From the categories and understanding granted by the
‘they-self’ the identity of the interlocutors is in serious doubt. After all,
Dasein in its worldly orientation recognizes that the characteristics between
itself and its caller are two dissimilar to constitute the same entity. This
seems to be exactly what Heidegger was pointing out in his phenomenological
analysis of the phenomenon. The call comes to Dasein lost in the ‘they.’ When
interpreted from that perspective there is only an intimation of an identity
which is covered over by the categories of the ‘they.’
At this point my positive proposal can be made explicit.
The seeming difference between the supposed interlocutors is a mere
interpretive epiphenomenon created by the interplay between the categories of
the ‘they-self’ and Dasein in its uncanniness. Now, it is important not to
interpret the term “epiphenomenon” as referencing a present-at-hand type of
substance. Instead, I use the term according to the literal meaning of the
word, a phenomenon which comes “after” or is derivative upon another
phenomenon. In this case the phenomenon is derivative from the implementation
of categories, not suited to an authentic understanding/recognition of Dasein.
When those categories come up against a forgotten aspect of Dasein, as it makes
itself known phenomenally, Dasein does not fully recognize the phenomenon as an
aspect of itself due to the categories from which it is taking its
interpretational cue. It is for this reason that Heidegger talks about
theological and biological understandings of the call of conscience as
interpretations—interpretations according to the categories of the ‘they.’
How does this solve the supposed incohereny? Because at
no time is Dasein ever bifurcated. When Dasein is mired in the ‘they-self’ it
disperses itself. Authenticity is the gathering in of this dispersal, bringing
explicit awareness to Dasein itself. Since Dasein is dispersed, fragments of
its self-awareness remain in everything. This can clearly be seen in the call
of conscience. From the vantage point of the ‘they-self’ the call seems to come
from beyond, although it clearly does not come from another, it seems to come
from within. This awareness is an implicit awareness of the identity of the
interlocutors. Dasein is not bifurcated, Dasein is dispersed and forgetful. No
chasm needs to be overcome. Just a reawakening of what is already available,
although in faint awareness. In the words of Michael Inwood:
If I am wholly in thrall to the ‘they’, how can
I ever hear the call of Conscience? How can there be a call of Conscience? The
call does not come from God, nor from any third party. This would not help to
answer our question. We could still ask: Why do some hear God’s call and others
not? Does he call louder to some and more softly to others? Or are some heavier
sleepers than others? Then the call of Conscience would be like an alarm-clock
ringing just loud enough to wake light sleepers. But the call does not come
from outside. It comes from Dasein itself: Dasein calls to Dasein. It can come
from Dasein itself, because Dasein is never wholly and irretrievably lost in
the they. Dasein retreats into the
security of the they owing to a
‘fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself—of itself as an authentic ability to
be its Self’ (BT, 184). But Dasein must have a glimpse of that from which it
flees. It is this residual awareness of its authentic self that enables Dasein
both to call to itself and on occasion to respond to the call. (Inwood 80)
From the gaze of the
‘they-self’ caller and called are interpreted as separate. Yet, there is a
kernel of awareness that there is a relationship between the two interlocutors.
This relationship, as Heidegger shows via hermeneutical analysis, lies in their
interconnection at the root of their Being. To be sure, the branches of that
root (i.e. addressee and addresser) have apparently
different characteristics from the vantage point of the ‘they-self’. Yet, these
apparent differences are only apparent and consequently do not create a
barrier. There is always a certain level of self awareness in every dispersed
Dasein. That basic level of self awareness makes possible the calling and calls
to the Dasein which has forgotten itself in the ‘they’.
Conclusion
Stephen Mulhall’s interpretation of the call of
conscience has led him to posit an inconsistency between the two interlocutors.
This inconsistency is directly linked to the bifurcation he sees existing
within Dasein. However, my alternative interpretation has shown that Dasein is
not bifurcated in this way and as a result Mulhall’s perceived inconsistency
doesn’t get a foothold. Consequently, his elaborate solution is unnecessary.
Dasein is not ontologically split; it has simply lost an explicit awareness of
itself and does not fully recognize itself when it comes into phenomenal
awareness via the call of conscience. Since there is a kernel of
awareness of the self, Dasein is able to call to itself and at times retrieve
itself from the ‘they-self’.
Works
Cited
Gelven,
Michael. A Commentary on Heidegger’s
Being and Time: Revised Edition. Illinois: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1989. Print.
Heidegger,
Martin. Being and Time. John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson trans. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1962.
Print.
Inwood,
Michael. Heidegger: A Very Short
Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Print.
Mulhall,
Stephen. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook
to Heidegger and Being and Time: 2nd ed. New York: Routledge:
Taylor & Francis Group, 2008. Print
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