Is Ethical Relativism Possible?

I fear our era has succumbed to ethical relativism—the view that there are no objective standards of right and wrong holding for all historical epochs, cultures, or individuals. “Different strokes for different folks,” is the anthem of our generation. “It is right for him,” or “that is her morality,” are regular facets of the relativists' discourse.       

Ironically, in my experience, those most committed to ethical relativism are unable to maintain their “enlightened,” views in practice. Emotion filled injunctions against war, torture, racisim and cultural imperialism are equally common facets of their discourse. If you doubt this, I encourage you to tell an ethical relativist that it is your morality to force your morality onto others. See how long they continue to sing their “different strokes for different folks,” anthem. While such observations indicate that ethical relativism is untenable in practice, I maintain that it is self-contradictory, on a conceptual level.

To see this, note that adherents—at least when they are not in an emotional fugue state— marshal arguments against objective moral standards. A common argument points to wide differences in cultural norms and mores, inferring that this evidence conclusively demonstrates the nonexistence of objective moral standards.[1] Whatever the virtues of such an argument are, it is important to note that all such arguments—and all arguments in general—rest on an implicit premise: if the argument is sound or cogent, we ought to accept it. In other words, it would be wrong to withhold our accent. Alternatively, it would be right or good to accent. Apparently, such arguments are supposed to be valid for all historical epochs, cultures or individuals. If I argue that cultural norms have varied throughout history and moral norms are therefore relative to historical epoch and culture, I am claiming that such observations would hold regardless of their time or location of utterance, and that therefore we ought to accept the inferred conclusion.

The normative terms, right, good, and ought, are presupposed with every argument. In fact, ethical relativists cannot offer any argument for their position without presupposing the imperative force their arguments should have for any person, at any place, during any time. The fact that such terms cannot be denied without contradiction indicates that their content—viz., goodness, rightness, etc.—is a basic feature of human cognition. We cannot engage in discourse, nor have knowledge of the world, free of such features.

In fact, an ethical relativist cannot escape the conclusion I have offered here without presupposing the content of those normative terms. For assume that a proponent were to argue against what I have said here. For example, he argues that my observations, as to the normative structure of argumentation, are flawed; or that relativists do not assume that their arguments hold across all times, places, or individuals. In rolling out his argument and positing his conclusion, the relativist would claim that “for these reasons we ought to reject what has been said here.” His argument would apparently apply to any similar observations, as to the normative structure of argumentation, regardless of time, location or person making such observations; or that relativists, regardless of time, location or proponent, do not make such assumptions. In other words, the ethical relativist, whatever the argument, cannot argue against what I have said here without presupposing the normative term, ought, good, or right.

Importantly, the foregoing normative terms are the basic terms employed in all ethical discourse. If they are a basic feature of human cognition, as I have argued here, their use can extend beyond argumentation, touching various fixtures of reality. Ethical relativism cannot argue against the objective existence of such terms without presupposing them. Perhaps I am wrong. If so, I invite the ethical relativist to present an argument that we ought to accept, contrary to what I have said here. In so doing, perhaps the proponent can rescue relativism from its self-contradiction and reestablishing it as a theory that ought to apply to all individuals, across all cultural and historical epochs. Needless to say, I won’t hold my breath. 

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[1] In my experience, if proponents offer arguments at all, they are not much more sophisticated than this. Yet, it must be noted that there are numerous sophisticated arguments for ethical relativism. Presenting such arguments is unnecessary for my purposes. My observations will point out general features common to all argumentation, however sophisticated. 

Leaving Neutral Ground: Same-Sex Marriage and Moral Neutrality Under the Law

It has often been said, by those within my personal circle, "I personally believe that same-sex marriage is wrong, but I don't want to impose my morality on others. The law should be morally neutral on this issue for equality's sake." Those who hold this view apparently fail to recognize that in uttering, "the law should be morally neutral," they are advocating a moral position, the contours of which are elucidated by the statement, "the law should be neutral as between neutrality and non-neutrality"—a logical impossibility. In other words, moral neutrality under the law proposes the cleansing of all moral views from the law, save moral neutrality itself. Uttering this proposition is somewhat like singing, "I am not singing!" Its self-referential inconsistency makes the position rationally suspect. Unfortunately, the proposition's inconsistency is dwarfed by its own absurd implications. As I see it, moral neutrality entails two such absurdities: (1) it undermines the basis upon which laws are said to be just or unjust, and (2) it abolishes the notion of "equality," from the law, or, in the very least, requires a non-moral rendering of that concept. [1]

First, moral neutrality undermines the basis upon which laws are evaluated. Minimally, the Law is that body of propositions which cannot conflict with moral edicts, if there be any—a concession to any moral nihilists which may be reading. For example, if it is morally impermissible to destroy another's property, without justification or consent, the law cannot sanction such acts and remain just. Some proponents of same-sex marriage recognizing this evaluative force say, "marriage is a basic human right," implying that marriage is a malleable form admitting of varying arraignments. If true, then the law is compelled to recognize such unions, unless some overriding considerations compel otherwise [2].  

Advocates of moral neutrality would blind the Law as to right and wrong. After all, if the law draws upon standards external to it, such as "human rights," in evaluating the nature of its own decrees, whether they be just or unjust, then the law is not, strictly speaking, morally neutral. It is non-neutral whenever it applies principles of a moral force to resolve disputes. Neither human rights, non-malfeasance, nor equality can be drawn upon in resolving conflicts. Moral neutrality, in short, removes the law from the burden of objective moral principles, rewarding us with a "government of men, not of law."

Second, moral neutrality either abolishes the notion of "equality," from the law, or scrubs it of any moral significance. As implied above, equality is a concept saturated with moral force. When Jefferson gave expression to the American mind in penning, “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” he was expressing a fundamental axiom of moral significance, upon which the principles of self-governance would flow with a necessary force. From its initial baptism in that sacred Declaration of Independence, "equality," as a concept, has held preeminence in the American mind, motivating us to consistently abolish our cruder natures in the search of more fuller expressions of justice. Undoubtedly "equality," is a concept with moral force drawn upon by the courts in tailoring just decisions. Yet, moral neutrality, by definition, cannot admit moral concepts into its ecumenical construction of the law. So, "equality," either cannot be used in such a scheme, or it must be understood in a non-moral sense. It is perfect satire that in relying upon equality to motivate moral neutrality, advocates have unwittingly written "equality," out of the law. So much for, "the law should be morally neutral for equality's sake."

Speaking of satire, it is noteworthy that within my personal circle, many advocates of moral neutrality are religious, espousing a belief in eternal, unchanging moral truths. Their desire to be inclusive as to the public sphere, has caused them to exclude from that venue the most important aspect of themselves, viz., their religious standards. My suspicion is that these individuals harbor doubts when they say, "same-sex marriage is wrong." Silently conflicted, they give a "tip of the hat" to traditional marriage, while paving a way for same-sex marriage via moral neutrality.

Tragically, these individuals do a great disservice to both sides of the debate. Not only do they ask their religious communities to exclude that most import part of themselves from the public sphere, viz. their religious standards, they make it reputable to say, "I personally believe," transforming universal moral edicts into the stuff of subjective preference. To open advocates of same-sex marriage, they giveth with one hand and taketh away with the other. In one open palm they grant same-sex marriage while implying, "such an institution can only be acceptable in an environment cleansed of moral significance." In the other open palm, they grant the term "equality," which has now become an empty token, stripped of its original moral force. In giving so little, and in taking so much, moral neutralists also ask proponents of same-sex marriage to exclude an important aspect of themselves from the public sphere: viz., their moral dignity. At least the neutralists are fair. To borrow a phrase from Justice Scalia, these individuals would cheat "both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat." [3]

Both sides owe it to the other to be honest and firm in moral conviction. Only then can we subject the very best of ourselves and our ethics to open public dialogue in the hope of establishing just laws. Aside from being destructive, moral neutrality is unnecessary. If same-gender marriage is morally permissible, the law has compelling reasons to allow the practice. If, however, it is morally impermissible, the law cannot allow its practice and remain just. In short, moral neutrality unnecessarily injures both sides of this debate. We should shun it for what it is, intellectual blurred vision. For it is only by leaving neutral ground that we fully recognize both sides, providing the arena each deserves for the fair resolution of so important an issue.

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[1] Many arguments herein rely on implicit premises. I believe such premises will be readily discerned and I have, for stylistic reasons, omitted them. Also, for sake of full disclosure, though this is not the focus of this post, the reader ought to know that the author is a defender of traditional marriage. My purposes in authoring this are to invite fellow interlocutors to leave "neutral ground," and to espouse the virtues of a bright contrast in this particular dialogue. It is my hope to instigate thoughtful and respectful discussion on such an important social issue.

[2] These issues are complex and simplification necessarily yields inaccuracy. Yet, it is important to note a fundamental difference in permitting immoral conduct, conduct which is malum in se, and failing to permit moral conduct. The former is never permissible, the latter, for countervailing reasons of sufficient force, is.

[3] Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in United States v. Windsor

Lehrer, Paxson and the Insufficiency of Knowledge as “Undefeated Justified True Belief”

In their essay, “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief,” Keith Lehrer and Thomas D. Paxson undertake a revision of the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, by adding a defeasibility condition. It is their intent to strengthen the traditional analysis through this fourth clause as to avoid Gettier cases. Additionally, Lehrer and Paxson offer their analysis of the conditions of knowledge as an improvement over Roderick Chisholm’s analysis who imports a defeasibility condition from ethics. It is their complaint that Chisholm’s analysis is too strong. It allows misleading defeaters to override would be cases of knowledge. Consequently, they also undertake a revision of Chisholm’s defeasibility clause that avoids these errors. Yet, it is my contention that Lehrer’s and Paxson’s revision of Chisholm’s defeasibility conditions create a characterization of knowledge which is too weak.

In characterizing knowledge as “undefeated justified true belief”, Lehrer and Paxson intend a specific type of knowledge. They are careful to demarcate basic knowledge from nonbasic knowledge. In brevity they characterize basic knowledge as: “S has basic knowledge that h if and only if (i) h is true, (ii) S believes that h, (iii) S is completely justified in believing that h, and (iv) the satisfaction of condition (iii) does not depend on any evidence p justifying S in believing that h” (Lehrer and Paxson, 255) As such, basic knowledge is non-mediate knowledge. Lehrer and Paxson are both agnostic about the existence of this type of knowledge[1] although they indicate that if such knowledge exists, it is not defeasible and as such cannot be properly characterized as “undefeated justified true belief.” So, their revision of the traditional analysis of knowledge is solely aimed at nonbasic belief.

Initially, they look at a preliminary definition of nonbasic knowledge that is essentially co-extensive with the traditional definition of the same. Specifically, they define non-basic belief as, “(i) h is true, (ii) S believes that h, and (iii*) p  completely justifies S in believing that h” ( 226-27). They are quick to point out the insufficiency of this definition as it does not block Gettier cases. In indicating a direction towards which a solution may be found, they point to Roderick Chisholm’s suggestion that justifications are defeasible (Chisholm, 48).  Taking their que from Chisholm they propose the following analysis of nonbasic knowledge: “S has nonbasic knowledge that h if and only if (i) h is true, (ii) S believes that h, and (iii) there is some statement p that completely justifies S in believing that h and no other statement defeats this justification” (Lehrer and Paxson, 227).

This characterization of nonbasic knowledge requires an additional definition however, viz. a definition of “defeats”. Lehrer and Paxson “adopting a suggestion of Chisholm’s” attempt the following: “when p completely justifies S in believing that h this justification is defeated by q if and only if (i) q is true, and (ii) the conjunction of p and q does not completely justify S in believing that h.” As persuasive as this definition may be, Lehrer and Paxson are emphatic that it is far too strong. Specifically, they claim that Chisholm’s suggestion allows misleading defeaters (i.e. defeaters which are themselves defeated) to override cases of would be knowledge. To demonstrate this point, Lehrer and Paxson present the “Tom Grabit” thought experiment. In this experiment it is suggested that a person S, sees a man—a man whom he takes to be Tom Grabit—walk into a library and remove a book. S is completely justified in his belief since he knows John personally and saw the individual in the library that he has characterized as Tom Grabit, in optimal epistemic conditions. Yet, suppose that unknown to S, Tom Grabit’s mother, Mrs. Grabit, has claimed that John was thousands of miles away on the day in question. Instead, it was Tom’s identical and maniacal twin, John Grabit. Further suppose that Mrs. Grabit is a pathological liar, and that her supposed son, John, is nothing more than an aberration of her sickened mind. John does not exist. Owing to the fact that the true statement q, “Mrs. Grabit has claimed that . . .” when conjoined with p does not completely justified S in believing that h, and further owing to the fact that Chisholm’s characterization of “defeats” does not contain a clause to block misleading defeaters, it follows that on Chisholm’s account, S does not have knowledge. Clearly, this definition of “defeats” is far too stringent. A revision is needed.

In searching for a plausible revision of Chisholm’s proposal, Lehrer and Paxson look at another thought experiment, one in which justification deserves to be overridden. Specifically, they look at a Gettier case wherein a professor is completely justified in believing that a student, Mr. Nogot, owns a Ford and on this basis forms the inference that someone in my class owns a Ford. As it turns out Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford, but Mr. Havit does. So, the professor is completely justified in holding a true belief, viz., that someone in his class owns a Ford. However, that justification is overridden by the defeater that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford, Mr. Havit does.

In looking at this additional thought experiment, Lehrer and Paxson note the differences between the two thought experiments given. Specifically, they claim that in the case of Tom Grabit, the defeater ought not count against my original justification whereas in the case of Mr. Nogot, the defeater ought to count against my original justification (229). Formulating this insight into an amended clause for the definition of “defeats” is awkward. For, as Lehrer and Paxson point out,

Why should one true statement but not the other be allowed to defeat my justification? The answer is that in one case my justification depends on my being completely justified in believing that Tom removed the book does not depend on my being completely justified in believing it to be false that Mrs. Grabit said Tom was not in the library and so forth. But my justification for believing that someone in my class owns a Ford does depend on my being completely justified in believing it to be false that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Thus, a defeating statement must be one which, though true, is such that the subject is completely justified in believing it to be false. (229)

In other words, complete justification in the case of misleading defeaters does not depend upon believing the misleading defeater to be false. In the case wherein a person’s justification is overridden, in order for them to be completely justified in believing a true statement h, they must be completely justified in believing a true defeater to be false. If they did not, their original justification, in regards to believing proposition h to be true, would not be complete. Lehrer and Paxson are playing upon the intuition that defeaters are completely unexpected facts. The fact that Mr. Havit owns a Ford, whereas Mr. Nogot does not, is unexpected and as such cannot factor into the requirement for complete justification.

Their suggested amendment to Chisholms proposal is as follows: “when p completely justifies S in believing that h, this justification is defeated by q if and only if (i) q is true, (ii) S is completely justified in believing q to be false, and (iii) the conjunction of p and q does not completely justify S in believing that h” (230). This amendment, however, contains a certain weakness; a weakness which I will outline in its most basic of structures. Lehrer and Paxson ask us to consider a case in which S has nonbasic knowledge of h. Additionally, in this thought experiment, “there is some true statement which is completely irrelevant to this knowledge and which [S] happen[s] to be completely justified in believing to be false” (230). Conjoin this irrelevant proposition, call it r, which S is completely justified in believing to be false, with q, which S is not completely justified in believing to be false, and you get the result that S is completely justified in believing the entire conjunction, call it c, to be false—for S is justified in believing the entire conjunction to be false if S is completely justified in believing any of its members to be false. The conjunction c when conjoined with p will, according to Lehrer’s and Paxson’s definition of “defeats”, override S’s justification for h on the basis of p; for p when conjoined with the conjunction c will not fully justify S in believing that h.

To remedy this problem an additional clause must be amended to the already cumbersome definition of “defeats”:

if p completely justifies S in believing that h, then this justification is defeated by q if and only if (i) q is true, (ii) the conjunction of p and q does not completely justify S in believing that h, (iii) S is completely justified in believing q to be false, and (iv) if c is a logical consequence of q such that the conjunction of c and p does not completely justify S in believing that h, then S is completely justified in believing c to be false. (231)

With this amendment, irrelevant propositions which S is completely justified in believing to be false, are ruled out. Conjunction c can only count against S’s justification for h if c is a “logical consequence” of a proposed defeater q—i.e. relevant to q. Furthermore, if c is a logical consequence, and if the conjunction of c and p overrides S’s justification, then S is completely justified in believing c to be false. In restricting their analysis in this manner, Lehrer and Paxson are confident that their definition of “defeats” is complete.

However, it is clear that this cumbersome definition of “defeats” is too weak. It allows in certain cases as knowledge, even when they ought not be considered as such. Taking a cue from Lehrer and Paxson, suppose that S is completely justified in believing that Tom Grabit took a book from the library. Further suppose that there is some true proposition, call it q, which S is not completely justified in believing. For example, “Mrs. Grabit claims that Tom was thousands of miles away and that it was Tom’s identical and maniacal twin John Grabit who took the book.” Additionally, suppose that there is some true proposition, call it r, which is added to q creating a disjunction, call it c, that S is completely justified in believing to be false: “Tom was actually thousands of miles away on the day in question and a secret government agent by the name of Ethan Hunt had access to a mask which was a perfect replica of Tom’s face and Hunt had access to a voice modulator that made his voice sound exactly like Tom’s.” Importantly, each member of the disjunction c, i.e. ‘q or r’, when conjoined with p does not completely justify S in believing that h. Furthermore, since S is only completely justified in believing any true disjunction to be false, when S is completely justified in believing each of its members to be false, it follows that S is not completely justified in believing that the conjunction of the disjunction c and the proposition p to be false. The result? The disjunction in question is ruled a misleading defeater by Lehrer’s and Paxson’s definition of defeats and as such it cannot count against S’s justification. S is said to have knowledge. Yet, this result is clearly incorrect. The true proposition c, dealing with government agent Ethan Hunt, should override S’s justification for h.[2]

Remedying the weakness in the conditions supplied by Lehrer and Paxson will not be easy. What is required is an amended condition which adjudicates between disjunctive statements which are bonafide defeaters and those which are misleading. On first blush, the most attractive solution is the following: If c is a logical consequence of q such that the conjunction of c and p does not completely justify S in believing that h, then S is completely justified in believing c to be false only if S is completely justified in believing each of the members of c in being false. Yet, it is clearly the case that this proposed condition is ad hoc. As such it is an unacceptable amendment to the already cumbersome list of conditions of defeasibility.

An alternative route, which may provide promise, appeals to the desirable notion of simplicity. Specifically, Lehrer and Paxson could claim that complex statements (i.e. conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals, etc.) must, if possible, be simplified via additional logical inferences which would decompose the statements before a conjunction is formed with p. In cases of complex conjunction, reduction would be produced simplification. In the current case of disjunction, simplification could be performed via disjunctive syllogism. Specifically, since S is completely justified in believing r (i.e. the proposition concerning agent Ethan Hunt) to be false, r can be used to infer q. With the disjunction decomposed down to q, a misleading defeater, r will override S’s justification. Stated more succinctly this condition is as follows: If c is a logical consequence of q such that the conjunction of c and p does not completely justify S in believing that h, then S is completely justified in believing c to be false, only if c (a complex statement) cannot bear further simplification via additional logical inferences which would decompose the statement.

While this approach is not susceptible to the charge of ad hoc—it does, after all, work well for conjunctions, conditionals and could, with additional language indicating that c be a logical consequence of q, replace Lehrer’s and Paxson’s current fourth condition—it still faces a number of problems. It is not clear than any statement, c, could survive in order to be conjoined with p. In the case of a conjunction, it is always the case that a conjunction can be simplified further. With a disjunction, if S is completely justified in believing any or all of the parts to be false, then the statement can be decomposed. In the end, the only statements which can survive are probably misleading defeaters. As such this proposed condition effectively blocks any complex statement from surviving except for disjunctions whose parts are all misleading defeaters.

This may not strike the reader as problematic until it is born in mind that some complex statements cannot be torn apart without loss to their content. For example, consider a slightly modified statement q: “Mrs. Grabit claimed that John Grabit, Tom’s twin brother, actually took the book and a week later it was determined that Mrs. Grabit has been suffering from schizophrenia and has completely imagined the former son who is non-existent.” Clearly, this statement is complex and can be broken apart via simplification. However, when broken apart, and individually conjoined to p, vital information is lost. For example, the statement, “a week later it was determined that Mrs. Grabit”, while in isolation, is not appropriately indexed to a particular event. The same goes for the statement “has completely imagined the former son who is non-existent son.” Without the larger context, the possibility remains that John Grabit is not an imagined son—some other former son being the imagined son—and that the statement was made after the onset of Mrs. Grabit’s schizophrenia. Clearly, certain complex statement, while susceptible to simplification, cannot bear decomposition without irrevocable loss to content. So, requiring of all complex statements that they bear further simplification via available logical inferences annihilates content from certain statements and as a result is inappropriate.  Lehrer and Paxson could attempt a modification to this current proposed condition which would attempt to save it from this type of difficulty. Specifically, they could identify complex statements that require unity for preservation of content and provide a language within the clause which eliminates them from the requirement of simplification. However, it is clear that any such attempt would be susceptible to the charge of ad hoc. Consequently, the current proposed condition must be scrapped.

Finally, at this point, it may seem appealing to simply amend a condition which effectively blocks all complex statements. Aside from being ad hoc, this approach would not even be desirable. There are plenty of imaginable statements which, like the modified statement q just given, require various conjunctions and disjunctions. Disbarring them out of hand could lead to the undesirable effect that S is ruled as having knowledge because a complex, bonafide defeater can’t get through. Clearly, this approach would be a step backwards and as such is not advisable.

Conclusion

In the end, it is clear that Lehrer’s and Paxson’s analysis of knowledge as “undefeated justified true belief” is insufficient. Furthermore, remedying the defects of their analysis is not easy. The unpredictable nature of defeaters affords to possibility of providing a highly complex logical inference which would show Lehrer’s and Paxson’s analysis to be either too strong or too weak. Additionally, it seems apparent from the foregoing analysis, that clauses attempting to remedy these problems will, in the end, be guilty of being ad hoc. So, it appears that Lehrer and Paxson will have tremendous difficulty in supporting this type of analysis and, in the opinion of this author, it seems apparent that this line of thought (i.e. characterizing nonbasic knowledge as “undefeated justified true belief”) will prove unfruitful in identifying the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of nonbasic knowledge.

Works Cited

Chisholm, Roderick M. “The Ethics of Requirement.” American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 2. April 1964. Web. July 2012. pp. 147-53.

Lehrer, Keith and Thomas Paxson, Jr. “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.” The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 66, No. 8. April 1969. Web. July 2012. pp. 225-237.

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[1] In giving an analysis of basic knowledge—the existence of which they are agnostic towards—Lehrer and Paxson want to insure that “such proposals are not excluded by [their] analysis” (226).

[2] It is important to note, that this type of counter example, has also been offered by Marshall Swain, although in abstract form. See Marshall Swain, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 18-19.

Defending Mary from Dennett

Since its initial publication in a 1982 article entitled “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Frank Jackson’s thought experiment involving Mary, a brilliant scientist, has been met with a voluminous amount of literature intending to refute the experiment. This response was to be expected. After all, if the thought experiment stands, then physicalism becomes an untenable ontological position and the belief that mental states can be reduced to gray matter will be a shipwrecked enterprise. In this paper, I will defend Jackson’s thought experiment from one of its more radical critiques as given by Daniel Dennett. I will show that Dennett’s critique is actually a red herring and as such does no damage to Jackson’s argument.

            

In Jackson’s experiment, Mary a brilliant young scientist, is “forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor” (Jackson 1982, p. 130). In this condition Mary is completely deprived of any color experiences. However, through this investigation Mary is able to acquire all physical facts pertaining to color vision. She understands, in the most exacting of detail, everything that goes into the formation of a color experience. She “discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces, via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence “the sky is blue”” (Jackson 1982, p. 130).

            

When Mary is eventually released from this controlled environment to experience color for the first time, it is clear that she will learn something new about color—specifically, what various colors look like. Even though Mary knows everything there is to know about the physiology and physics of blue, as experienced when looking at the sky, it is clear that upon first seeing a blue sky she is learning something new; viz. the phenomenal feel of “sky blue.” Yet, if Mary learns something new, “then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false” (Jackson 1982, p. 130).

            

It is hard to overestimate the ramifications of this thought experiment. If Jackson is right, then all facts in the universe are not physical facts. There are also phenomenal facts which are of a different kind. If this is the case, then physicalist ontology is a dead enterprise. For the sake of precision and forthcoming analysis, I will set forth Jackson’s argument into premise and conclusion format:

1.     Before her release from her black and white environment, Mary had all physical information about various color experiences.

2.     Upon her release Mary, for the first time, experiences what it is like to see various colors. Through these experiences Mary acquired new information—i.e. information pertaining to the phenomenal property of what it is like to see a particular color.

3.     If Mary were to acquire new information outside of the room, then that information would be nonphysical (by definition from 1)

C1. Upon her release, Mary obtained information which was nonphysical (modus ponens by 2, 3)

4.     If Mary acquired information which was nonphysical, then it pertained to a nonphysical property of the color experience.

C2. The information Mary received via experiencing color demonstrates that there is a nonphysical property pertaining to the experience of color (modus ponens by C1, 4).

5.     If color experiences have a component which is nonphysical it follows, by definition, that physicalism is false (by definition from physicalism).

C3. Physicalism is false (modus ponens by C2, 5).

Before moving onto Dennett’s attempted refutation of this argument, it is important to point out the full implications of Jackson’s thought experiment. Specifically, even though this thought experiment analyzes a singular sense modality, it could, in principle, be extended to all sense modalities. It is easy to imagine a similar thought experiment for tactile, auditory and olfactory experiences—in short for all sense experiences. Consequently, the Mary experiment purports to show that the most basic building blocks of conscious experience, qualia, cannot be accounted for via physicalism.

DANIEL DENNETT AND MARY

The philosopher Daniel Dennett objects to Jackson’s thought experiment outright. Specifically Dennett claims that Jackson has given us “a bad thought experiment, an intuition pump that actually encourages us to misunderstand its premises” (Dennett 1991, p. 399). In other words, Jackson’s thought experiment plays on un-tuned intuition as to what physical information can reveal. From here, he makes an easy transition to its conclusion “physicalism is false.” According to Dennett,

 “The image is wrong; if that is the way you imagine the case, you are simply not following directions! The reason no one follows directions is because what they ask you to imagine is so preposterously immense, you can’t even try. The crucial premise is that “She has all the physical information.” That is not readily imaginable, so no one bothers. They just imagine that she knows lots and lots—perhaps they imagine that she knows everything that anyone knows today about the neurophysiology of color vision. But that’s just a drop in the bucket, and it’s not surprising that Mary would learn something if that were all she knew.”

So Dennett will run the thought experiment over again, taking very seriously the claim that Mary possess all physical information pertaining to color vision. This emphasis will be a key point in Dennett’s denial of the second premise in Jackson’s argument above. If Dennett can establish his case then the rest of Jackson’s argument from premise two onwards will be false. By encouraging us to take seriously the claim that Mary has all the physical information Dennett hopes to tune our intuitions into greater clarity, thus allowing us to see that Jackson’s thought experiment does not prove anything at all. In order to achieve the greatest clarity possible, I will simply cite the thought experiment Dennett gives at length:

And so, one day, Mary’s captors decided it was time for her to see colors. As a trick, they prepared a bright blue banana to present as her first color experience ever. Mary took one look at it and said “Hey! You tried to trick me! Bananas are yellow, but this one is blue!” her captors were dumfounded. How did she do it? “Simple,” she replied. “You have to remember that I know everything—absolutely everything—that could ever be known about the physical casues and effects of color vision. So of course before you brought the banana in, I had already written down, in exquisite detail, exactly what physical impression a yellow object or a blue object (or a green object, etc.) would make on my nervous system. So I already knew exactly what thought I would have (because, after all, the “mere disposition” to think about this or that is not one your famous qualia, is it?). I was not in the slightest surprised by my experience of blue (what surprised me was that you would try such a second-rate trick on me). I realize it is hard for you to imagine that I could know so much about my reactive dispositions that the way blue affected me came as no surprise. Of course it’s hard for you to imagine. It’s hard for anyone to imagine the consequences of someone knowing absolutely everything physical about anything!” (Dennett 1991, p. 399-400)

         

How Dennett envisions Mary being able to accomplish such a feat is not wholly clear. To be sure, she has all the physical facts, providing information far above and beyond anything our intuitions can currently imagine. However, even though Dennett assures this, it appears he believes Mary has to perform some type of inference in order to get at the phenomenal data of a color experience.

Specifically, Dennett claims that Mary has a great deal of knowledge at her disposal already. She already knows varying shades of gray; the difference between “such surface properties as glossiness versus matte, and she knows the difference between luminance boundaries and color boundaries” (Dennett 1991, p. 400). All of this information is combined with detailed knowledge of how her Nervous system will react to any given wavelength of light. In Dennett’s words,

the only task that remains is for her to figure out a way of identifying those neurophysiological effects “from the inside.” You may find you can readily imagine her making a little progress on this—for instance, figuring out  tricky ways in which she would be able to tell that some color, whatever it is, is not yellow, or not red. How? By noting some salient and specific reaction her brain would have only for yellow or only for red. But if you allow her even a little entry into her color space in this way, you should conclude that she can leverage her way to complete advance knowledge, because she doesn’t just know the salient reactions, she knows them all (Dennett 1991, p. 400-01)

So, it seems clear that Dennett’s explanation to render plausible exactly how Mary is gaining her knowledge of color experience is via inference from information she already has.

In the end, Dennett’s position seems strong and clear. We cannot possibly know what possessing all physical information pertaining to a given domain would be like. In order to reach a sweeping ontological conclusion (i.e. physicalism is false) based on our current intuitions as to what physical information can be said to provide, is premature at best.

WHY DENNETT IS WRONG

           

I think it can be established that Jackson has not given us a mere intuition pump and that Dennett has actually provided us with an elaborate red herring. In order to demonstrate that point I will run the thought experiment again, in a modified form, with the hopes that Dennett’s faulty reasoning can be exposed. However, before I undertake that endeavor, I would like to acknowledge two points by way of critique. These need to be set forth to adequately prepare the ground for my thought experiment.

           

First, I would like to hone in on Dennett’s Mary. In order to render plausible the idea that Mary has not learned anything new at all, Dennett focuses on her ability to distinguish colors. She knew she was being tricked when she was handed a bright blue banana. She was able to accomplish this feat through a detailed knowledge of her nervous system and how it would react with varying wavelengths of light. This characterization of the situation does not demonstrate that Mary hasn’t learned anything new though. All Dennett has demonstrated is that Mary has “know how” when it comes to distinguishing colors. To be sure, “know how” is likely a necessary condition in saying whether someone has knowledge of different colors. If May were unable to distinguish a blue banana from a yellow one, we would not say that she had the relevant knowledge of colors.

           

Even though “know how” may be necessary condition in saying whether someone has knowledge of color, it is not sufficient. We can imagine Mary distinguishing colors merely by the behavior of her central nervous system. She may have no clue that blue has that type of look and feel and yet “know how” to distinguish it from yellow merely by noting that the patterns of firing produced in her central nervous system do not conform to the physical information she already possesses in regards to color interaction with her nervous system. So, “know how” is not sufficient to prove Dennett’s case. In effect, it appears that Dennett has tried to conflate notions of “know how” with “know that” in order to make his thought experiment more plausible. However, in so doing he has presented us with a red herring that detracts us from the original question: Does Mary learn anything new? We are looking for indications that Mary has gained “know that,” not merely “know how.” The possession of “know how” with all physical information is not all that implausible, even for Jackson’s Mary.

           

Second, Dennett is encouraging us to dispel our intuitions in regards to what type of knowledge physical information could provide. Essentially, he is claiming that with a complete inventory of all the physical information—a situation we can’t currently imagine—qualia will come along for free. In other words, complete physical information will allow us to gain knowledge of qualia experiences free of those experiences themselves. Dennett recognizes that physical facts, as currently envisioned, cannot perform the feat he is requiring of them. So, he asks us to write a blank check against our well-trained intuitions in anticipation of the problem being resolves with an exhaustive inventory of the physical facts. The problem with this whole set up, is that Dennett emphasizes the problem as being one of quantity—we do not have all the physical information—not one of quality.  Knowledge gained via inference from physical facts to particular quale is qualitatively different than knowledge gained by a direct experience of those quale themselves.

In essence, all physical information gives Mary a foothold from where she can infer her way to a full knowledge of qualia. As Dennett puts it, “if you allow her even a little entry into her color space in this way . . . she can leverage her way to complete advance knowledge, because she doesn’t just know the salient reactions, she knows them all” (Dennett 1991, p. 400-01). The difficulties associated with a serious defense of this position are paramount. Perhaps foremost is the difficulty of establishing that knowledge of qualia gained by inference has the same modal quality as knowledge gained by direct experiences. No matter how sound an inference may be, the possibility of error is always looming and with it the possibility that our judgment concerning some entity or entities, in this case qualia, may in fact be incorrect. The same cannot be said of a direct experience of a quale, say the color red. It is not in doubt whether or not I am seeing that color, there, right in front of me. Furthermore, it is not in doubt whether or not that color there has the properties I see it to have. My knowledge is direct and therefore indubitable. To be sure, I can doubt whether or not I am applying the term “red” in the same manner as the community at large. However, that is tangential to the issue. Our knowledge, from a direct experience of a quale is of a different modal quality than knowledge gained by an inference. Consequently, it seems clear that all the physical facts does not get us the same type of knowledge that direct experience does. Hence, Mary would learn something new upon leaving her black-and-white room for the first time.

So, with Dennett conflating notions of “know how” and “know that” and with it apparent that we cannot even conceive of what type of physical information would provide us undubitable knowledge of qualia experiences free from those experiences themselves, it becomes clear that Dennett has not made his case that Jackson has given us a mere intuition pump. Jackson is not solely playing on our intuitions. He is leveraging our best understanding of what physical information can be taken to demonstrate. Free of some radical new understanding of how physical information, even all physical information in a given domain, could be used to achieved knowledge with the characteristics ascribed to qualia, we are not compelled to accept Dennett’s conclusions. Dennett asks us to write a blank check, claiming that some day all physical information will be able to account for all the facts within the universe. With no indication of whether or not Dennett’s gamble is right, it would be unwise to accept his invitation.

           

MARY THOUGHT EXPERIMENT CONTRA DENNETT

With the key information in place, and with a preliminary critique, I can now run Jackson’s thought experiment over again from a different angle. This time, I will employ two Marys, Mary 1 and Mary 2. Running the thought experiment with separate Marys in tandem will allow me to use one Mary as a control. This control will allow us to see the difference between “know how” and “know that” knowledge, as well as demonstrating that knowledge via nervous system inference is not of the same character as knowledge via direct experience.

Mary¹ and Mary² have been forced to investigate the world through a black-and-white room. In this condition they are able to obtain all the physical facts pertaining to color vision. To have all the physical facts pertaining to color vision is to fully and completely exhaust all possible physical information on the subject. To be sure, we cannot imagine what it would be like to have all physical information on this given subject, since our current understanding of the human nervous system is in its infancy. The information it provides may be far grandeur than we could imagine, exceeding even our greatest expectations.

Those who have placed Mary¹ and Mary² in there black-and-white cells have every intention of releasing them into the world. However, before they do, they decide, at random, to use Mary¹ as a control. In essence, the put Mary¹ under the knife, ablating critical connections to the cortical regions responsible for color processing. Since Mary¹ has all physical facts pertaining to color vision, she knows exactly how this procedure has effected her nervous system and will be able to compensate for it when seeing color. As Mary¹ and Mary² first color experience, her captures have prepared a bright blue banana. Upon being presented with this banana, Mary¹ appears shocked. She cannot believe that her captors have played such a trick on her. She tells them that the banana is a lighter shade of blue and not yellow like bananas are supposed to be. When they asked her how she accomplished such a feat, she responded that she knew in acute detail how the wavelengths would react with her retina and the associated portions of her cerebral cortex, including how the ablations would effect the flow and process of visual information. She knew how to distinguish sky blue from yellow due to this information.

In a parallel room, Mary² is also handed a sky blue banana. Upon being handed the banana Mary² is also stunned that her captors would play such a trick on her. When asked how she knew that the banana was not yellow, she gave much the same response as Mary¹. However, unlike Mary¹, Mary² is actually having the experience of sky blue. This experience, or “the what it feels like” of sky blue is information which Mary¹ does not have at her disposal. Consequently, it seems clear that mary² has gained nonphysical information not available to Mary¹. Therefore, not all facts in the universe are physical facts and physicalism is false.

Dennett may be inclined to respond with the same line of attack with which he started, i.e. I am not taking seriously the claim that Mary¹ has all physical information about color vision. This includes her exhaustive information of Mary² and her healthy, functioning nervous system. Consequently, she would know, in rich detail, how such an experience must be for Mary². So, Mary², has not gained information unavailable to Mary¹. In response, it may become immediately clear how inadequate this line of response is. For Mary¹ to know, in rich detail, the experience that Mary² is having, via Mary²’s nervous system, would require an inference from the physical information to the quale of sky blue itself. However, as I have already pointed out, knowledge via inference is not of the same modal kind as knowledge of qualia via direct acquaintance. This modal difference should be sufficient to establish that even if Mary¹ we able to infer Mary²’s experience, should would not gain information of the same modal kind, and consequently, Mary² still has access to information not available to Mary¹. So the above conclusion that physicalism is false, must hold.

CONCLUSION

Frank Jackson’s thought experiment with Mary, a brilliant young scientist, has been faced severe criticism on many fronts. One critic, Daniel Dennett, has given perhaps the most radical critique claiming that Jackson has given us a mere intuition pump. Dennett further argues that given all physical information it is possible that Mary learns nothing at all. I have demonstrate that Dennett’s argument is a red herring in so far as he conflates notions of “know how” with “know that.” We are not interested in whether or not Mary can distinguish colors, we want to know if she learns something new. Additionally, Dennett’s claim that Mary can gain information of qualia via an inference from the physical facts is implausible on modal grounds. Consequently, in running the Mary experiment again and providing a control I was able to demonstrate that Jackson’s thought experiment avoids Dennett’s criticisms and that Jackson’s initial conclusion can hold. Consequently, barring stronger arguments from Dennett, it appears that physicalism is false and some form of ontological dualism or pluralism is implied.

Works Cited:

Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained (New York: Back Books Company/Little, Brown and Company, 1991)

Jackson, Frank. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” The Philosophical Quarterly (Apr. 1982) pp. 127-136