I fear our era has
succumbed to ethical relativism—the view that there are no objective standards
of right and wrong holding for all historical epochs, cultures, or individuals.
“Different strokes for different folks,” is the anthem of our generation. “It
is right for him,” or “that is her morality,” are regular facets of the relativists' discourse.
Ironically, in my experience, those most committed to ethical relativism
are unable to maintain their “enlightened,” views in practice. Emotion filled
injunctions against war, torture, racisim and cultural imperialism are equally
common facets of their discourse. If you doubt this, I encourage you to tell an
ethical relativist that it is your morality to force your morality onto others. See how long they continue to sing
their “different strokes for different folks,” anthem. While such observations
indicate that ethical relativism is untenable in practice, I maintain that it
is self-contradictory, on a conceptual level.
To see this, note that adherents—at least when they are
not in an emotional fugue state— marshal arguments against objective moral
standards. A common argument points to wide differences in cultural norms and
mores, inferring that this evidence conclusively demonstrates the nonexistence
of objective moral standards.[1] Whatever
the virtues of such an argument are, it is important to note that all such
arguments—and all arguments in general—rest on an implicit premise: if the
argument is sound or cogent, we ought to
accept it. In other words, it would be wrong
to withhold our accent. Alternatively, it would be right or good to accent.
Apparently, such arguments are supposed to be valid for all historical epochs,
cultures or individuals. If I argue that cultural norms have varied throughout
history and moral norms are therefore relative to historical epoch and culture,
I am claiming that such observations would hold regardless of their time or location
of utterance, and that therefore we ought
to accept the inferred conclusion.
The normative terms, right, good, and ought, are presupposed with every argument. In fact, ethical
relativists cannot offer any argument for their position without presupposing
the imperative force their arguments should
have for any person, at any place, during any time. The fact that such terms
cannot be denied without contradiction indicates that their content—viz.,
goodness, rightness, etc.—is a basic feature of human cognition. We cannot
engage in discourse, nor have knowledge of the world, free of such features.
In fact, an ethical relativist cannot escape the conclusion I have
offered here without presupposing the content of those normative terms. For
assume that a proponent were to argue against what I have said here. For
example, he argues that my observations, as to the normative structure of
argumentation, are flawed; or that relativists do not assume that their
arguments hold across all times, places, or individuals. In rolling out his
argument and positing his conclusion, the relativist would claim that “for
these reasons we ought to reject what has been said here.” His argument would apparently apply to any similar
observations, as to the normative structure of argumentation, regardless of
time, location or person making such observations; or that relativists,
regardless of time, location or proponent, do not make such assumptions. In
other words, the ethical relativist, whatever the argument, cannot argue against
what I have said here without presupposing the normative term, ought, good, or right.
Importantly, the foregoing normative terms are the basic terms employed
in all ethical discourse. If they are a basic feature of human cognition, as I
have argued here, their use can extend beyond argumentation, touching various
fixtures of reality. Ethical relativism cannot argue against the objective
existence of such terms without presupposing them. Perhaps I am wrong. If so, I
invite the ethical relativist to present an argument that we ought to accept, contrary to what I have
said here. In so doing, perhaps the proponent can rescue relativism from its
self-contradiction and reestablishing it as a theory that ought to apply to all
individuals, across all cultural and historical epochs. Needless to say, I
won’t hold my breath.
[1] In
my experience, if proponents offer arguments at all, they are not much more
sophisticated than this. Yet, it must be noted that there are numerous
sophisticated arguments for ethical relativism. Presenting such arguments is
unnecessary for my purposes. My observations will point out general features
common to all argumentation, however sophisticated.
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