Knowledge has traditionally been defined as "justified true belief" (these three terms representing the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge--i.e. whenever these three occur, knowledge is the necessitated outcome). To be sure, this definition has in recent years be shown insufficient (i.e. if a person has justified true belief, they don't necessarily have knowledge). Nevertheless, some defeasibility theories, which attempt to preserve the traditional definition while strengthening the requirement for justification (e.g. Lehrer's and Paxson's definition of nonbasic knowledge as "undefeated justified true belief") may hold some promise. But, whatever approach you take, there is something intuitive about the notion that we can only have knowledge of something that it true (e.g. I can't say that I 'know' my keys are on my nightstand if they aren't on my nightstand. If there is doubt about this imagine what happens to my knowledge claim when I confidently come looking for my keys and they aren't there.); that has received proper evidentiary support--i.e. justification (e.g. If I claim that my keys are on my nightstand, but have no reason for believing so--i.e. I have no memory of placing them there, it is not the usual spot that I place them, etc.--even if it turns out that they are on my nightstand I can't be said to "know"; I simply posited a lucky guess.); and that we "believe" (e.g. If I claim that my keys are on my nightstand, have reasons for making the claim and it is in-fact true, if I don't believe it my claim doesn't count as knowledge. Knowledge claims are accompanied by a type of certitude which, lacking belief, is not present). So there is something right about the "justified true belief" analysis of knowledge.
Yet, when it comes to religious knowledge it seems far too narrow. To understand why we need look at the term "belief" which is a propositional attitude. Propositional attitudes are transitive verbs, representing cognitive and/or existential attitudes, which, apparently--although Bertrand Russell gives reason to believe otherwise--take a direct object (if they don't, as Russell suggests, then they aren't properly defined as transitive verbs even though they grammatically function in that manner). For some the object propositional attitudes take is the proposition--timeless entities which reside outside of space and grant meaning to our language; language derives its meaning by coming into contact with these timeless, spaceless entities which are akin to numbers in their ontological status (other philosophers believe that posting these type of immaterial entities is unnecessary and therefore violates Ockham's razor.) Ontological considerations aside, it appears certain that various propositional attitudes can be taken towards a variety of knowledge claims. In the case of religion, observers of various faiths do not simply "believe" the content of their religion; they also "hope for", "have faith in", "desire that", etc. So, if the traditional analysis of knowledge is taken to be all inclusive, it misses a large array of potential knowledge claims based on different propositional attitudes. For example, a Christian devotee does not simply "believe that" Jesus is the Christ, and then has evidentiary support or justification for that belief; instead, a Christian devotee also "hopes that" Jesus Christ will provide him or her with salvation and provides evidentiary support for why that hope is not ill founded. Another example is that Christian's often have "faith in" Christ, and give reasons as to why their faith is well founded. As the Apostle Paul says in Hebrews 11:1--faith is the 'evidence' of things unseen--true faith is not blind.
So the next time someone wants to play the game of 'how do you know your religion is true' and you give experiences and reasons which fall outside the traditional analysis of knowledge (i.e. justified true belief), just remember that knowledge claims have a whole host of attendant propositional/cognitive/existential attitudes and that depending on the propositional attitude attached to the claim, different types of evidentiary support are permissible. The traditional analysis is fairly worthy, although insufficient, in relation to the propositional attitude of belief. But religion is far richer than mere "belief" and far more encompassing. Consequently, fear not in holding these other attitudes and in giving evidentiary justification which looks strange in the eyes of those who hold to the traditional analysis--they may wish to down play your religious claims as mere "faith" or "belief" as opposed to reason. If and when they do, remember that "faith," "belief," "hope," "desire," etc. are essential to the exercise of reason, they are attitudes we take towards knowledge claims about the world. Reason, is not divorced from these subjective attitudes. Those who claim otherwise do not truly understand what knowledge is.
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