Before proceeding further, however, I need to carefully explicate Clark's argument. For sake of accuracy, I quote Clark at length:
"There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent being. For since something must needs have been from eternity, as has been already proved and is granted on all hands, either there has always existed some one unchangeable and independent being from which all other beings that are or ever were in the universe have received their original, or else there has been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all. Now this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must in its accounts of most thing [. . .] terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly impossible and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the supposed impossibility of infinite succession, barely and absolutely considered in itself, for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider such an infinite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings, it is plain this whole series of beings can have not cause from without of its existence because in it are supposed to be included all things that are, or ever were, in the universe. And it is plain it can have no reason within itself for its existence because no one being in this infinite succession is supposed to be self-existent or necessary (which is the only ground or reason of existence of anything that can be imagined within the thing itself [. . .]), but every one dependent on the foregoing. And where no part is necessary, it is manifest the whole cannot be necessary - absolute necessity of existence not being an extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential property of the nature of the thing which so exists."
From this, Clark concludes that atheism sacrifices the principle of sufficient reason, since it cannot explain the existence of the entire cosmos. For sake of clarity, I will set forth concisely Clark's main premises below.
Diagram: X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X
- If the entire cosmos is composed of contingent beings (i.e. a being that could or could not exist), then we can explain the existence of a particular contingent being in terms of the totality of contingent beings or some subset thereof.
- For example, a tree is a contingent being (think of an X in the previous chart as a tree). We can explain the existence of a tree with certain physical realities (a seed, soil, water, sunlight) that converge to bring the particular tree into existence (think of the X previous as the physical realities). In turn, we can explain the those physical realities, which are contingent, in terms of other physical realities that converge to bring them into existence. And so on, ad infinitum. This would explain a contingent being by a subset of contingent beings.
- Alternatively, we could attempt to explain the existence of a contingent being by pointing to the totality of all existing beings. In the simple diagram above, we may say the final X relies on the totality of contingent things for its being. This isn't exactly what Clark has in mind, but I will set forth what he has in mind below.
- Such an explanation will satisfy the principle of sufficient reason, which holds that for every being that exists or has existed, there is an explanation of the existence of that being.
- However, while we can explain the existence of a particular contingent being (a particular X in the series above), we cannot explain the existence of the entire series of contingent beings in terms of the totality of contingent beings or some subset thereof.
- After all, since the series is composed of particular contingent beings, it follows that the totality and any subset is contingent as well.
- Thus, to explain the series' existence, we must suppose that a necessary being exists (i.e. God, a being that could not not exist).
More concretely, unless we presuppose that God exists, we cannot explain why something rather than nothing exists at all. The very existence of the cosmos requires a creator, since neither the cosmos, or any part of the cosmos, can explain its own existence.
For atheism, this argument poses a threat, since it cannot explain the very existence of the world, and as such, sacrifices the principle of sufficient reason as to the whole of reality. Likewise, for Mormonism, this argument also poses a threat. After all, as Terryl Givens has observed: "God is the supreme intelligence in the universe, but he is not the source of all being, or even the creator of that which constitutes the human soul. Men and women have existed from eternity as uncreated intelligence."** In other words, the universe and human souls within that universe have existed for eternity. Clark's argument is threatening precisely because Mormonism, it would seem, sacrifices the principle of sufficient reason by taking the entire cosmos as a brute fact.
While some Mormons may be willing to make that sacrifice, they do not need to do so. Clark's reasoning, after all, rests on the fallacy of composition. The fallacy of composition names a form of faulty reasoning, wherein an argument concludes that a whole possess a certain property because its parts possess that property. This is flawed reasoning, however. A Grand Piano is not light-weighted merely because its component parts (keys, strings, wood) are light-weighted. Likewise, just because the particular beings in the cosmos are contingent (it is possible for them to not exist), it does not follow that the entire cosmos is contingent.
Notice that Clark must rely on this flawed assumption.*** After all, if the entire cosmos exists necessarily (as Mormonism contends), then we do not need to invoke the existence of an immaterial, transcendent God to explain its existence. Thus, Clark's argument fails at premise 4 above. This shows that Clark's argument fails on its own terms.
Thus, it seems clear to me that Mormonism escapes Clark's argument. It seems less clear to me, however, that atheism escapes Clark's challenge. After all, certain types of scientific atheism claim that the entire universe flashed into existence with the big bang. In these brands of scientific atheism, the whole cosmos is contingent, it could have never existed. And if the cosmos is contingent, then atheists need some way to explain its existence if atheism is to preserve the principle of sufficient reason. Since Mormonism rejects this entire picture of the cosmos, it easily survives Clark's argument.
________________________________________________
* Cosmological arguments focus on the causal structure of the cosmos. In comparison, teleological arguments focus on designed complexity in the cosmos. Alma, in the Book of Mormon, confronts Korihor with what appears to be a teleological argument for God's existence: "But Alma said unto him: Thou hast had signs enough; will ye tempt your God? Will ye say, Show unto me a sign, when ye have the testimony of thy brethren, and also all the holy prophets? The scriptures are laid before thee, yea, and all things denote there is a God; yea, even the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it, yea, and its motion, yea, and also all the planets which move in their regular form do witness that there is a Supreme Creator." (Alma 30:44). In a previous post, I took up this argument to show why Alma's putative teleological argument is quite unlike from the teleological arguments of the philosophers.
**Terryl L. Givens, Wrestling the Angel: The Foundation of Mormon Thought: Cosmos, God, Humanity, page 45.
***I think Clark resists this conclusion by noting that "absolute necessity of existence not being an extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential property of the nature of the thing which so exists." In other words, necessary existence is not a property like weight, and as such, making this inference does not commit the fallacy of composition. I cannot go into that argument here, but it should suffice to note that Alvin Plantinga has persuasively demonstrated that "necessity" is a predicate in modal logics. This, in my judgment, lays the ground work for showing that Clark's attempt to resist the fallacy of composition by noting that necessary existence has to do with essence, not property, is flawed.
No comments:
Post a Comment