Mormonism and the Contingency Cosmological Argument

     Ancient and modern philosophers have frequently attempted to construct arguments that command rational assent to the existence of God. One class or family of arguments for the existence of God goes by the name "cosmological arguments." These arguments aim to show that we cannot explain the cosmos and its causal structure without a creator.* Samuel Clark (1675 - 1729) offered a unique type of cosmological argument styled the "contingency cosmological argument." Specifically, Clark argues that atheism undermines the principle of sufficient reason, which holds that for every being that exists or ever existed, there is an explanation of the existence of that being. Since modern atheism relies on science to provide an exhaustive explanation of the cosmos, Clark's claim poses a serious threat. Interestingly, Clark's claim also threatens Mormonism's claim that the cosmos is co-eternal with God.

     Before proceeding further, however, I need to carefully explicate Clark's argument. For sake of accuracy, I quote Clark at length:

"There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent being. For since something must needs have been from eternity, as has been already proved and is granted on all hands, either there has always existed some one unchangeable and independent being from which all other beings that are or ever were in the universe have received their original, or else there has been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all. Now this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must in its accounts of most thing [. . .] terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly impossible and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the supposed impossibility of infinite succession, barely and absolutely considered in itself, for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider such an infinite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings, it is plain this whole series of beings can have not cause from without of its existence because in it are supposed to be included all things that are, or ever were, in the universe. And it is plain it can have no reason within itself for its existence because no one being in this infinite succession is supposed to be self-existent or necessary (which is the only ground or reason of existence of anything that can be imagined within the thing itself [. . .]), but every one dependent on the foregoing. And where no part is necessary, it is manifest the whole cannot be necessary - absolute necessity of existence not being an extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential property of the nature of the thing which so exists."

From this, Clark concludes that atheism sacrifices the principle of sufficient reason, since it cannot explain the existence of the entire cosmos. For sake of clarity, I will set forth concisely Clark's main premises below.

Diagram: X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X---------->X

1. If the entire cosmos is composed of contingent beings (i.e. a being that could or could not exist), then we can explain the existence of a particular contingent being in terms of the totality of contingent beings or some subset thereof.
1. For example, a tree is a contingent being (think of an X in the previous chart as a tree). We can explain the existence of a tree with certain physical realities (a seed, soil, water, sunlight) that converge to bring the particular tree into existence (think of the X previous as the physical realities). In turn, we can explain the those physical realities, which are contingent, in terms of other physical realities that converge to bring them into existence. And so on, ad infinitum. This would explain a contingent being by a subset of contingent beings.
2. Alternatively, we could attempt to explain the existence of a contingent being by pointing to the totality of all existing beings. In the simple diagram above, we may say the final X relies on the totality of contingent things for its being. This isn't exactly what Clark has in mind, but I will set forth what he has in mind below.
2. Such an explanation will satisfy the principle of sufficient reason, which holds that for every being that exists or has existed, there is an explanation of the existence of that being.
3. However, while we can explain the existence of a particular contingent being (a particular X in the series above), we cannot explain the existence of the entire series of contingent beings in terms of the totality of contingent beings or some subset thereof.
4. After all, since the series is composed of particular contingent beings, it follows that the totality and any subset is contingent as well.
5. Thus, to explain the series' existence, we must suppose that a necessary being exists (i.e. God, a being that could not not exist).

More concretely, unless we presuppose that God exists, we cannot explain why something rather than nothing exists at all. The very existence of the cosmos requires a creator, since neither the cosmos, or any part of the cosmos, can explain its own existence.

     For atheism, this argument poses a threat, since it cannot explain the very existence of the world, and as such, sacrifices the principle of sufficient reason as to the whole of reality. Likewise, for Mormonism, this argument also poses a threat. After all, as Terryl Givens has observed: "God is the supreme intelligence in the universe, but he is not the source of all being, or even the creator of that which constitutes the human soul. Men and women have existed from eternity as uncreated intelligence."** In other words, the universe and human souls within that universe have existed for eternity. Clark's argument is threatening precisely because Mormonism, it would seem, sacrifices the principle of sufficient reason by taking the entire cosmos as a brute fact.

     While some Mormons may be willing to make that sacrifice, they do not need to do so. Clark's reasoning, after all, rests on the fallacy of composition. The fallacy of composition names a form of faulty reasoning, wherein an argument concludes that a whole possess a certain property because its parts possess that property. This is flawed reasoning, however. A Grand Piano is not light-weighted merely because its component parts (keys, strings, wood) are light-weighted. Likewise, just because the particular beings in the cosmos are contingent (it is possible for them to not exist), it does not follow that the entire cosmos is contingent. 

     Notice that Clark must rely on this flawed assumption.*** After all, if the entire cosmos exists necessarily (as Mormonism contends), then we do not need to invoke the existence of an immaterial, transcendent God to explain its existence. Thus, Clark's argument fails at premise 4 above. This shows that Clark's argument fails on its own terms. 

     Thus, it seems clear to me that Mormonism escapes Clark's argument. It seems less clear to me, however, that atheism escapes Clark's challenge. After all, certain types of scientific atheism claim that the entire universe flashed into existence with the big bang. In these brands of scientific atheism, the whole cosmos is contingent, it could have never existed. And if the cosmos is contingent, then atheists need some way to explain its existence if atheism is to preserve the principle of sufficient reason. Since Mormonism rejects this entire picture of the cosmos, it easily survives Clark's argument.

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* Cosmological arguments focus on the causal structure of the cosmos. In comparison, teleological arguments focus on designed complexity in the cosmos. Alma, in the Book of Mormon, confronts Korihor with what appears to be a teleological argument for God's existence: "But Alma said unto him: Thou hast had signs enough; will ye tempt your God? Will ye say, Show unto me a sign, when ye have the testimony of thy brethren, and also all the holy prophets? The scriptures are laid before thee, yea, and all things denote there is a God; yea, even the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it, yea, and its motion, yea, and also all the planets which move in their regular form do witness that there is a Supreme Creator." (Alma 30:44). In a previous post, I took up this argument to show why Alma's putative teleological argument is quite unlike from the teleological arguments of the philosophers.

**Terryl L. Givens, Wrestling the Angel: The Foundation of Mormon Thought: Cosmos, God, Humanity, page 45.

***I think Clark resists this conclusion by noting that "absolute necessity of existence not being an extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential property of the nature of the thing which so exists." In other words, necessary existence is not a property like weight, and as such, making this inference does not commit the fallacy of composition. I cannot go into that argument here, but it should suffice to note that Alvin Plantinga has persuasively demonstrated that "necessity" is a predicate in modal logics. This, in my judgment, lays the ground work for showing that Clark's attempt to resist the fallacy of composition by noting that necessary existence has to do with essence, not property, is flawed.

Alma's Teleological Argument

     A well worn argument for God's existence goes by the title, "the teleological argument." Numerous philosophers from Aristotle to William Paley have employed the teleological argument to demonstrate God's existence. These philosophers' arguments rely on theologically neutral premises (i.e. premises that can command the assent of any rational non-believer) about the purpose, order, or design of the universe for the conclusion that God exists. This is why some refer to the teleological argument as the argument from design.

     As an amateur philosopher, I am skeptical of the teleological argument. Specifically, such arguments rest on selective data. They point to purpose, order, or design in the universe (so called teleological data) to the exclusion of disorder and other needless evils (disteleological data). For this reason, David Hume remarked that the state of the universe doesn't prove the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent deity, but instead suggests that whoever created the universe was an inexperienced infant deity. In his words:

"The world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: It is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity, and is the object of derision to his superiors: It is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. . . ."

     As a Latter-day Saint, I am skeptical of the teleological argument because in its more sophisticated iterations, it leads to the existence of an abstract deity, not the embodied personal deity of Joseph Smith. So, as both amateur philosopher and Latter-day Saint, I was initially perplexed by the apparent presentation of a teleological argument for God's existence in Alma 30:44.

     In that chapter, Korihor, described as an "Anti-Christ," argues against the existence of God. The Book of Mormon summarizes Korihor's teachings as follows:

"O ye that are bound down under a foolish and a vain hope, why do ye yoke yourselves with such foolish things? Why do ye look for a Christ? For no man can know of anything which is to come. Behold, these things which ye call prophecies, which ye say are handed down by holy prophets, behold, they are foolish traditions of your fathers. How do ye know of their surety? Behold, ye cannot know of things which ye do not see; therefore ye cannot know that there shall be a Christ. Ye look forward and say that ye see a remission of your sins. But behold, it is the effect of a frenzied mind; and this derangement of your minds comes because of the traditions of your fathers, which lead you away into a belief of things which are not so."

(Alma 30:13 - 16). In modern philosophical parlance, the Book of Mormon characterizes Korihor as an empiricist, a humanist, and an atheist.*

     Eventually, the Nephite priests bring Korihor before Alma, the Chief Judge and governor over all the land. In response to Korihor's atheism, Alma presents what appears to be a teleological argument for God's existence:

"But Alma said unto him: Thou has had signs enough; will ye tempt your God? Will ye say, Show unto me a sign, when ye have the testimony of all these thy brethren, and also all the holy prophets? The scriptures are laid before thee, yea, and all things denote there is a God; ye, even the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it, yea, and its motion, yea, and also all the planets which move in their regular form do witness that there is a Supreme Creator."

(Alma 30:44). This teleological argument, on first blush, appears to suffer from the same flawed reasoning that David Hume showed above. Alma cites harmonious order but ignores the violence, destruction, and disorder that naturally occurs in the cosmos. In addition, even if Alma's argument succeeds, it's not clear whether it demonstrates the existence of an embodied deity.

     In my judgment, reading Alma's argument in this manner--i.e. as a traditional teleological argument--misreads the text. To properly understand Alma's argument, we must look at the clauses that proceed his apparent teleological argument, and to the conclusion of the entire Alma 30 narrative.

     Alma prefaces his teleological argument by noting that Korihor has the testimony of all his brethren and the holy prophets[.] Furthermore, Alma tells Korihor that the scriptures are laid before thee. In so doing, Alma situates his "teleological argument" in the context of prior belief in the scriptures. He does not provide a teleological argument that aims to provide deductive certainty as to God's existence. Nor does he aim to show inductively the likelihood of God's existence. On the contrary, Alma says to Korihor, "[t]he scriptures are laid before thee[.]" He does not rely on empirical, teleological data, free of theological assumptions, to prove God's existence. He relies on the veracity of sacred texts, which show the existence of God. After referencing the scriptures, Alma points to the ordered heavens as evidence for God's existence.

     This theologically saturated preface suggests that Alma views the scriptural witness as an interpretive key to the universe. In other words, the scriptures operate as an interpretive lens that enables a person to see what he could not see without them: harmonious order that bears the imprint of a divine artificer. Alma doesn't attempt to prove God's existence through empirical, teleological data. He suggests that when a person comes to know the God of heaven and earth through the scriptures, he will begin to see that God in the world around him. As a believer in God and a follower of Christ, this interpretive lens is no mere interpretation, it is a perspective on the true nature of reality; a perspective that cannot be gained in any other way. In short, the scriptures bring us to a knowledge of God and permit us to see the world as it really is. If I read Alma correctly, this line of thought is a far cry from Aristotle's or William Paley's teleological arguments, which rely on religiously neutral premises to hopefully demonstrate God's existence to the rational non-believer.

     Why would Alma, however, employ sacred writings to make this argument? After all, Korihor, an atheist, would reject these writings as the "foolish traditions of [Alma's] fathers." It seems Alma, as a prophetic figure, relied on these texts because he knew that Korihor did not, in fact, reject the testimony of the prophets. In the narrative's closing scene, Korihor gives an insightful concluding statement:

". . . I always knew that there was a God. But behold, the devil hath deceived me; for he appeared unto me in the form of an angel, and said unto me: Go and reclaim this people, for they have all gone astray after an unknown God. And he said unto me: There is no God; yea, and he taught me that which I should say. And I have taught his words; and I taught them because they were pleasing unto the carnal mind; and I taught them, even until I had much success, insomuch that I verily believed that they were true; and for this cause I withstood the truth[.]"

(Alma 30:52 - 53). Alma perceived that Korihor knew that God existed. Alma, therefore, relies on this knowledge to remind Korihor that the universe testifies of God's existence. For those who already believe that God exists, the whole visible world takes on new meaning. Far from playing the part of philosopher or theologian, Alma plays the part of a prophetic midwife, helping Korihor to birth the forgotten truth that he knew all along; a forgotten truth that would allow Korihor to see the world as it really is: a testament to God's living existence.

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* See, e.g., Chauncey Riddle, Korihor: The Arguments of Apostasy, Neal A Maxwell Institute for Religious Scholarship, BYU. I would caution relying on these terms too heavily, however. These terms arose in particular European cultural situations. They invoke a family of views that gain their content from a complex cultural situation. Given more information about Korihor and his cultural context, it is likely that these terms would fail to adequately explain his thought.