Friday, July 20, 2012

The Occasional Tidbit--Religious Knowledge, the Traditional Analysis and Propositional Attitudes

Knowledge has traditionally been defined as "justified true belief" (these three terms representing the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge--i.e. whenever these three occur, knowledge is the necessitated outcome). To be sure, this definition has in recent years be shown insufficient (i.e. if a person has justified true belief, they don't necessarily have knowledge). Nevertheless, some defeasibility theories, which attempt to preserve the traditional definition while strengthening the requirement for justification (e.g. Lehrer's and Paxson's definition of nonbasic knowledge as "undefeated justified true belief") may hold some promise. But, whatever approach you take, there is something intuitive about the notion that we can only have knowledge of something that it true (e.g. I can't say that I 'know' my keys are on my nightstand if they aren't on my nightstand. If there is doubt about this imagine what happens to my knowledge claim when I confidently come looking for my keys and they aren't there.); that has received proper evidentiary support--i.e. justification (e.g. If I claim that my keys are on my nightstand, but have no reason for believing so--i.e. I have no memory of placing them there, it is not the usual spot that I place them, etc.--even if it turns out that they are on my nightstand I can't be said to "know"; I simply posited a lucky guess.); and that we "believe"  (e.g. If I claim that my keys are on my nightstand, have reasons for making the claim and it is in-fact true, if I don't believe it my claim doesn't count as knowledge. Knowledge claims are accompanied by a type of certitude which, lacking belief, is not present). So there is something right about the "justified true belief" analysis of knowledge.

Yet, when it comes to religious knowledge it seems far too narrow. To understand why we need look at the term "belief" which is a propositional attitude. Propositional attitudes are transitive verbs, representing cognitive and/or existential attitudes, which, apparently--although Bertrand Russell gives reason to believe otherwise--take a direct object (if they don't, as Russell suggests, then they aren't properly defined as transitive verbs even though they grammatically function in that manner). For some the object propositional attitudes take is the proposition--timeless entities which reside outside of space and grant meaning to our language; language derives its meaning by coming into contact with these timeless, spaceless entities which are akin to numbers in their ontological status (other philosophers believe that posting these type of immaterial entities is unnecessary and therefore violates Ockham's razor.) Ontological considerations aside, it appears certain that various propositional attitudes can be taken towards a variety of knowledge claims. In the case of religion, observers of various faiths do not simply "believe" the content of their religion; they also "hope for", "have faith in", "desire that", etc. So, if the traditional analysis of knowledge is taken to be all inclusive, it misses a large array of potential knowledge claims based on different propositional attitudes. For example, a Christian devotee does not simply "believe that" Jesus is the Christ, and then has evidentiary support or justification for that belief; instead, a Christian devotee also "hopes that" Jesus Christ will provide him or her with salvation and provides evidentiary support for why that hope is not ill founded. Another example is that Christian's often have "faith in" Christ, and give reasons as to why their faith is well founded. As the Apostle Paul says in Hebrews 11:1--faith is the 'evidence' of things unseen--true faith is not blind.

So the next time someone wants to play the game of 'how do you know your religion is true' and you give experiences and reasons which fall outside the traditional analysis of knowledge (i.e. justified true belief), just remember that knowledge claims have a whole host of attendant propositional/cognitive/existential attitudes and that depending on the propositional attitude attached to the claim, different types of evidentiary support are permissible. The traditional analysis is fairly worthy, although insufficient, in relation to the propositional attitude of belief. But religion is far richer than mere "belief" and far more encompassing. Consequently, fear not in holding these other attitudes and in giving evidentiary justification which looks strange in the eyes of those who hold to the traditional analysis--they may wish to down play your religious claims as mere "faith" or "belief" as opposed to reason. If and when they do, remember that "faith," "belief," "hope," "desire," etc. are essential to the exercise of reason, they are attitudes we take towards knowledge claims about the world. Reason, is not divorced from these subjective attitudes. Those who claim otherwise do not truly understand what knowledge is.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Language, Meaning, Referent, and Fictional Characters


It is commonly believed that words derive their meaning from what they refer to. For example, when the noun “Judson” is uttered its meaning obtains in virtue of who it picks out. If there is more than one Judson, and the context requires it, then further specification, such as a last name, may be required to single out the referent. With the referent fixed, it is believed that the meaning naturally follows: “Judson Burton is the person with such and such characteristics and properties.”

Yet, it also seems clear that meaning cannot solely derive from reference. For example, how does the noun “Sherlock Holmes” get its meaning? Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character and does not exist. But how can we talk about something which does not exist? How can we talk about nothing? (This raises another interesting point, if words get their meaning by referring to things, how does the word “nothing” get its meaning? Nothing does not exist and if it did its very existence would contradict the meaning of the term it is suppose to lend meaning to through the referent relation). If our commonsense idea about how words get their meaning is correct (i.e, through a referent relation), and if the intuition that we cannot talk about nothing is right, then it seems to follow that fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes, must exist in some way—perhaps as abstract objects outside of space and time. Positing the existence of a whole array of fictional characters as abstract objects may provide the best explanation for how meaning is infused into language and will preserve our commonsense notion of language.

Someone may object that such extremes are unnecessary. The names of fictional characters derive their meaning, as the objection may go, from referring to the properties that supervene or ride upon the set of statements told about the fictional character. However, this claim cannot make sense of our ability to rule a statement about a fictional character as true or false even though the information is not contained in any of the statements about that fictional character (e.g., “Anna Karenina is more intelligent than Emma Bovary”—no fiction contains both of these characters and neither of their fictions contains this comparison, yet we are able to rule it as true). So, in the end, it seems that fictional characters may in fact exist. It makes the best sense of our language and it may explain the psychological exhilaration we feel when we come into contact with them—they are after all abstract objects from another realm.

Saturday, June 23, 2012


A Journey into the Absurd: My Hopes and Purposes for this Blogspot
         
The intentions of this blogspot, and its ensuing posts, are partially selfish and partially evangelical. It will provide me with an avenue to publicly explore an entire array of philosophical concepts. The nature of those concepts will range from the religious to the unexcitingly technical. I anticipate that few of the ideas expressed here will be original. That, however, is not of concern to me.  What is of concern is that I have unhampered digital space in which to explore the mysteries of mind, existence, morality, knowledge, language, religion and God. Those who read my thoughts on these subjects ought not to expect flawless argumentation and continuity of models between the various posts—I fully expect to contradict myself along the way. What I say about the nature of religion on one post may completely override what I have said in an earlier one. The mind and soul are in constant process and I fully expect to see that process come alive and unfold within this digital workspace. I will be less concerned with logical and semantic perfection and more concerned with striking out into bold horizons. There will be an occasional logical fallacy and fuzzy definition. To the extent that these can be kept to a minimum they will be. However, I am not a first rate philosopher. I am a fallible man with finite cognitive capacities attempting to navigate the intense difficulty of this terrain. My hope is that this blogspot will become a silent conversational partner to the contents of my imagination; allowing me to develop and peruse them free of judgment and ridicule.

Next, this post is declaredly evangelical--i.e., actively disseminates philosophical ideas with the hopes of conversion. It is my belief that each and every human soul engages in philosophical reflection. If you are religious and have ever wondered how an all knowing God, who knows every act we will commit in our lives, allows us room for true freedom, then you have engaged in philosophical reflection. If you have ever strained at a decision, hoping to survey your options for the one which is most morally correct, then you have engaged in philosophical reflection. If you have ever wondered how Darwinian evolution leaves open space for divine action in the cultivation of species, then you have engaged in philosophical reflection. In short, if you have ever been met with a cognitive puzzle which has relevance for your life, the type of person you are or will become, and the belief content you will allow into your intellectual horizon, then you have engaged in philosophical reflection. I anticipate that nearly every one of you has ruminated upon philosophical issues. To the extent that each of us engages in these practices it is important that we do them well. Poor performance in matters philosophical can lead to undesirable outcomes. So, I hope that this blogspot will light the fires for a ‘love of wisdom’ within those who read it. Most importantly, it is my hope, that the issues explored herein will not require elaborate mental gymnastics, devolving into little more than a soduko puzzle with no relevance for lived existence. Instead, it is my hope, that the issues herein will require the reader to explore his or her own beliefs on the relevant matters and that those reflections will change the way he or she thinks about life, world, and God. 

Finally, the title of this blogspot is Ab Absurdo (Latin—‘from the absurd’)—philosophical tidbits. The reason I settled upon this title is because individuals find philosophical reflection, or at least the type that I engage in, to be absurd. To see why, I need give but a little background on my own beliefs, laying some of my cards out before the reader. I am unabashedly religious. To my friends and family I am God intoxicated. Consequently, for those of my friends who are atheist or agnostic, much of the underlying assumptions and eventual conclusions of my thought will be unsustainable. For those sober minded individuals it will often sound as if I am ‘going up in a balloon’—to borrow a phrase from William James. From their perspective my thoughts may appear genuinely absurd. Conversely, for those of my friends who are religious, it may be the case that my heightened critical analysis on a whole range of topics that have relevance for religious discourse, belief and practice, will come across as absurd. Religion is something to be lived, not reflected upon—they may say. Heightened analysis is corrosive to the vital life force of religion in the minds of many. I am sensitive to this concern and will try to lead on in such a way that religion is given room to breathe. Too often religion is taken as guilty until proven innocent. That will not be the case here. Religion is innocent until proven guilty within this blogspot—and proving it guilty of error is not, to my understanding, an easy affair. However, I will not be apologetic for using the tools of rational reflection for investigating religious concepts. I believe that God had purpose is bestowing the faculty of reason upon humankind—much as Prometheus had purpose in gifting men with fire. To the extent that reason is not respected and understood, it will burn us. So, extremes in either direction of requiring all reality to bow to cognition or of slovenly avoiding rational reflection for fear of burning oneself will be unacceptable within boarders of this blogspot. If this approach strikes the reader as absurd, then he or she can simply write of the entire enterprise as ‘Ab Absurdo.’ If however, the enterprise has value to you as a reader, then it may well be the case that you have transgressed the boarders of accepted thought and discourse from the vantage point of your community and have become someone ‘from the absurd.’ One way or another this blogspot will most likely appear to be ‘from the absurd’—either in the eyes of its readers or in the lives of those who take its content seriously.